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SHADOW PRICES FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT CRITERIA 
By Banri ASANUMA * 
Introduction 
A variety of discussions about how to construct investment criteria 
have appeared since the last half of the 1950's, partly out of experiences 
in making public investments both in advanced and developing countries, 
and partly out of the development of the theory of business financell . 
This problem is nothing other than an application of the theory of inter-
temporal resource allocation, so that it has a close connection with the 
traditional marginal analysis of capital and mathematical programming. 
In this paper, limiting the scope to the field of public investment, 
we shall focus our attention on the problem of the discount rate after a 
brief discussion about investment criteria. Then, using the idea of Fisher-
ian (and Hirshleiferian) marginal analysis as a stepping-stone, we shall 
attempt to grasp the social rate of discount as a shadow price of a 
nonlinear program. In the last part of the paper, we shall give a brief 
comment on problems requiring further consideration. 
I General Form of Investment Criteria 
To begin with, let us first observe the form of investment criteria 
broadly accepted, and look at the relations between them and the theory 
of optimization. We shall make a distinction between the problem of 
the evaluation of individual projects and the problem of selecting a suit-
able set from among alternative projects, and then take up these two 
problems in that order. 
I. 1. Evaluation of a Project 
I. 1. 1. Initial Data 
From the economist's point of view a project IS characterized by a 
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Kyoto University 
1) In the U. S. A., economists at Harvard University have been tackling the problem of water 
resources development and Eckstein, [10] appeared in 1958 as une of the earliest crystalliza-
tions of such study. In France, where nationalization made progress after World War II, 
studies on investment criteria have been pursued by the public electric power corporation as 
well as in many other national industries and since about 1960 British and American resear-
chers have begun to turn their eyes toward these works. The work by Masse, [19] reflects 
the practices in France, and the work by Solomon, [20] collected various argwnents about 
investment criteria developed in the field of theory of business finance in the United States. 
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stream of revenues and outlays which begins with its starting point and 
continues until its horizon, or, in the language of the theory of public 
finance, the stream of its benefits and costs. In the following analysis 
we shall adopt the period analysis. Let the present moment .be expressed 
as t=O, and the moment r years later as t=r (r=I, ... , T). Let the year 
from t=r-l to t=r be called the r-th period. Let B, denote the benefit 
from the project during the r-th period, 0, the operating cost, and K, 
the capital cost [expenditure]. Then, taking B,-O,-K,=R" a project 
can be expressed by a sequence or vector (Ro, R" ... , R,), of which the 
component R, (r=O, 1, ... , T) is the net benefit in the r-th period. 
While K, in normal cases is thought to accrue concentratedly at the 
initial moment (and also at the time of renewal), B;s and O;s are such 
items that are expected to accrue every year, frequently for 50 years 
to come and sometimes for 100 years to come, making it a hard task to 
estimate them. 
Furthermore, speaking of the benefit of public investment, so-called 
indirect benefits and intangible benefits being of great importance, the 
determination of its extent and evaluation in money terms involve con-
siderable difficulty'). But in this paper we shall not discuss these points. 
We shall assume that data about the stream of B;s, O;s and K;s are 
available and that we can disregard uncertainty. 
Now, as we can readily see by such an example as two sequences 
(-1,0, 4) and (-1,2, 1), it is generally impossible to determine the 
relative merit of one project to another by a direct comparison of the 
sequences of the net benefits. It is necessary to construct an index which 
can express the economic worth of a project by a single number. For 
this purpose the following methods have been worked out and are in 
use: 
( I) The net present value method; 
( n ) The benefit-cost ratio method; 
( ][) The internal rate of return method; 
(N) The annual cost method; 
(V) The payback period method. 
Here we shall simply take up the net present value method without 
going into further comparative discussions about these methods'). 
I. 1. 2. Net Present Value 
Discounting is the operation of converting economic quantities of differ-
ent times into commensurable quantities by giving them certain relative 
weights. The numerical value obtained by adding each term of the net 
2) Kumagai. [13]. pp. 290. 293. 
3) For a brief explanation of these methods, see Masse, [19}. 
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benefit sequence (Ro, R" ... , R T) of a project after discounting each term 
to the present moment is the net present value of the project. 
In other words, denoting the weight to be given to economic quanti-
ties at t=O, 1, ... , T by .10, A" ... , AT respectively, the net present value 
V of the project is given by: 
V=Ro+~R,+",+ AT RT (1.1) 
.10 .10 
This can, as is well known, also be expressed by: 
V=Ro+~+"'+ RT (1.2) 1 + r, (l + r,)( 1 + r2) .•. (l + r T) 
where r. (,=1, ... , T) denotes the discount rate for the ,-th period. 
Hence, the relation between the discount rate and the weight IS 
given by: 
r.= A·-A-A. (,=1, ... , T) (1·3) 
• 
Obviously, the net present value of an identical project varies with 
the set of the discount rates or weights chosen. For the moment we shall 
proceed with our discussion, taking it for granted that a "correct" set 
of discount rates or weights are given. 
I. 2. Selection of Project 
Suppose that we face a variety of projects, finite in number, the 
choice of which is our task. Assume that the net present value of 
each project be known. According to what criteria should we make the 
selection? 
I. 2. 1. Case without Budgetary Constraint 
When there is no budgetary constraint, we can simply base our deci-
sion upon the rule: "If the net present value of a project is positive, 
adopt it. If negative reject it." That this rule accords with the opera-
tion of optimization can be seen in the following way. 
Now, for the sake of simplicity, let the outlay of the capital cost be 
made only at the initial moment and denote it by a variable K. Since 
the given list of projects provides a technical possibility as a whole, let 
us construct a function G(K) by taking the maximum available present 
value of "benefit minus operating cost" for each value of K. The func-
tion V(K)=G(K) -K associates the maximum available net present value 
with each value of K. Assuming V(K) to be differentiable, the necessary 
condition for the maximum of V(K) is given by: 
dV = dG -1 - 0') (I . 4) dK-dK -. 
That is, the net present value for the marginal fund should be zero. 
4) Marglin. [15]. p. 82. 
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This condition can be approximated in the actual case of finite alterna-
tives by the following rule. Array the projects in decreasing order of 
the net present value per one unit of capital outlay of each project, and 
adopt all those that give positive values. (The one with a zero value is 
a marginal pro jeet and it is indifferent whether we adopt it or not.) 
This rule of thumb corresponds to the maximum condition in the contin-
uous case above and gives the maximum sum of net present values 
available. 
I. 2. 2. Case with Budgetary Constraint 
When there is budgetary constraint, it becomes in general impossible 
to adopt all the projects with positive net present values, because of the 
constraint. This can be seen if we consider a non-linear program: 
"Maximize V(K) subject to K:;;;;K", where K is a certain constant. De-· 












Therefore, the net present value for the marginal fund should now be A,. 
which is perhaps positive when the budgetary constraint is effective'). 
It seems that this condition could be approximated by the following 
rule of thumb in actual cases where the number of alternative projects 
is finite. Array the projects in decreasing order of the net present value 
per one unit capital outlay of each project, and adopt them one by one 
until the budget is exhausted. But, in these cases where there are budgetary 
constraints, if the indivisibility of each project is to be taken into account,. 
the above rule can not in general give the optimal solution. This problem 
was firstly noticed by Lorie and Savage'), and was attacked and solved by 
Weingartner by the explicit formulation of an integer program'). The present 
writer has also attempted to make some points clearer'). But in this paper, 
5) Kuhn and Tucker, [12J. 
6) For the explanation through the classical Lagrange multipliers, see Eckstein, [10]. p. 75., 
For the explanation through non-linear programming, see Marglin, [15], pp. 82-84. Marglin 
is taking m projects into consideration there, but one investment opportunity will serve the 
purpose of this paper for the present. Later in Section III n projects which are components 
of the investment opportunity will be taken explicitly into consideration. 
7) Lorie, James H., and Savage, Leonald ]., "Three Problems in Rationing Capital ", Journal 
of Business, XXVIII, 4, Oct. 1955, pp. 229-239. (Reprinted in [20J) 
8) Weingartner, Martin ]., Mathematical Programming and the Analysis of Capital Budgeting 
Problems, 1963. 
9) Asanuma, [3J and [4]. 
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we shall go ahead without going into further details about this problem. 
I. 3. The Discount Rate 
I. 3. 1. Source of the Problem 
In cases without budgetary constratints, we can satisfy the optimum 
·condition by merely checking the sign of the net present value of .each 
project. In cases with budgetary constraints, it becomes necessary to 
handle mathematical programming, though it might be possible to solve 
simpler programs merely by renumeration. But, in these cases also, the 
net present value data are indispensable. 
However, as already suggested before, to calculate the net present 
value, the definition and the numerical value of the "correct" set of 
discount rates should be provided. 
In 1-2 we proceeded under the assumption that the correct set of 
·discount rates was given. On that account, what was stated there is so 
general that it is applicable both to public and private investment. 
In fact, in a textbook-like world of perfect competition, all economic 
agents face a single market rate of interest. And, if each agent seeks 
maximization of his intertemporal utility or the net present value taking 
this market rate of interest as the discount rate, the market rate of interest 
tends to be settled at an equilibrium level that brings the aggregate 
savings and investments of the society to equality. Moreover, this state 
of equilibrium is a "Pareto optimum" in the sense that no consumer 
can be made better off as to his intertemporal utility without making 
someone else worse off. Therefore, in such a world, the market rate of 
interest can be unique and can have a certain normative implication so 
that there is no room for any particular problem in the determination of 
the rate of discount. 
However, it has been pointed out on many occasions that there are 
some problems in the functioning of the market mechanism as to intertem-
poral resource allocation. Firstly, there has been an issue since Pigou. 
That is to say, the time preference of an individual for his private deci-
sions is "myopic" in the sense that it tends to overdiscount future con-
sumption. Therefore the rate implied in it does not justify such long-life 
investments that involve benefits for future generations, which are under-
taken frequently by public authorities. Secondly, on account of the im-
perfections of the capital market and uncertainty about the future the 
market rate of interest tends to be diversified. Therefore we have nO 
guarantee for its uniqueness as well as its normative propertylO). 
Consequently, to face reality it becomes necessary to reexamine the 
.definition of the optimal discount rate for each type of economic agent 
10) About this point, see Kumagai, [I3], pp. 288-289. 
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according to its nature and purposes, and then reflect upon the welfare 
implications of several discount rates. 
Discussions about" the cost of capital" in the field of business finance 
involve the determination of the optimal discount rate under the imper-
fections of the market from the viewpoint of a firm. In this paper, how-
ever, we shaH not go into discussions about the situations specific to 
business firms; we shall focus our attention on the determination of the 
,discount rate from the viewpoint of public authorities. 
1. 3. 2. Lines of Analysis 
It seems, roughly speaking, that there are two different kinds of 
thinking about the determination of the discount rate for public invest-
ment. 
The first one proposes to utilize investment efficiency in the field of 
private investment. The most direct form of this standpoint is to apply 
the marginal internal rate of return in the private sector without any 
modification to public investment"). However, as suggested before, there 
are some doubts in this way of thinking since there exists a gap between 
the time preference of a typical individual reflected in private investments 
and the patterns of time distribution of benefits in a variety of 
public investmets even under the assumption of a perfect capital 
market. There is also a variation of this type of view, which proposes 
to re-evaluate the investment efficiency achieved by private investment 
in terms of the same benefit as the aim of public investment to get the 
marginal social rate of return, and utilize this figure as the discount 
rate") . Anyway, the first standpoint takes the view of determining 
the adoption or rejection of public projects exclusively on the basis of 
their comparison with private marginal projects, instead of forming a 
positive judgement of value. If the net present value which is ac-
quired by applying the said rate happens to be "positive", it means that 
the efficiency of the public project in question is superior to that of 
the private marginal projects, and if " negative", inferior. However, as 
asserted by Arrow13l , though it may be possible to use this type of cri-
terion to answer such a partial question as the relative merits of two 
,different projects, this type of criterion can not answer the question of 
whether two such investments should both be adopted or not--the 
problem of the determination of the optimal amount of investment from 
an over-all point of view. Therefore it may safely be said that the first 
way of thinking is inadequate for fundamental judgements, although it 
11) Marglin, [IS]. pp. 4S-51. 
12) Ibid., pp. 51-53. 
13) Arrow, [II, pp. 2-3. 
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may possibly be used with reservation as a convenient tool for making 
a quick judgement of the efficiency of a relatively small public project. 
The second one takes the standpoint of grasping the discount rate as. 
it should be on the basis of information derived from a planner's time 
preference function which is laid down from an over-all point of view"). 
Needless to say, this standpoint quickly gives rise to the delicate problem 
of questioning how the planner's time preference function is established. 
Nevertheless, since we can make use of a plain scheme which has a wide 
scope of vision as our starting point, we shall develop our further argu-
ment along the line of this second standpoint. 
n Marginal Analysis 
II. 1. Investment Decision of an Individual 
To see the problem in constrast, let us first see how the investment 
decision of an individual is analysed by the traditional analysing apparatus. 
What is going to be taken up here is the method of analysis which 
originated from Irving Fisher in his "Theory of Interest" and has been 
recently reproduced by Hirshleifer15). In this method there appear on the 
scene at the same time three settings: the time preference of an indivi-
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14) Marglin, [18] clearly stands for this view. 
15) Hirshleifer, [II]. 
nity of investment. Con-
sequently it becomes a 
characteristic of this me-
thod that we can see 
decisions in the area of 
production as well as de-
cisions in the area of con-
sumption at a glance. 
The essentials of this 
method of analysis can 
be grasped geometrically 
in the simple case of two 
periodsl6) • 
The income and con-
sumption for the current 
period (period 0) is meas-
16) Figure I is prepared with some changes in symbols in the diagram on page 206 of Hirshlei-
fer, [II]. 
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ured in a suitable unit (for example in dollars) along the horizontal 
axis and the income and consumption for the next period (period 1) 
.along the vertical axis. For simplification, the initial position of an 
individual is represented by Q (i. e., the income for the current period 
is Yo= OQ and the income for the next period is zero)17l. 
Now, suppose that he is faced with two kinds of opportunity of 
investment. One is the productive opportunity for investment, which is 
represented by the curve QR'T. For instance, if he makes an investment 
.as in QD in the current period, he will gain an income of OE in the next 
period. Since the investment for the next period can not be taken into 
·consideration in this two-period analysis, the point R' represents a combina-
tion of consumption OD for the current period and consumption OE for 
the next period. 
The second opportunity of investment is the money or capital market, 
where he can lend or borrow at a certain market rate of interest, which 
is represented by the dotted-lines of the diagram QQ', PP', etc. When 
the capital market is perfect and the interest rate remains constant 
regardless of the volume of transactions, the market opportunity of invest-
ment is represented by a family of parallel straight lines as shown in the 
d.iagram. The movement from point R' to point R along the market line 
PP' means borrowing DF in the current period with an agreement to 
return EC in the next period. Supposing the interest rate is i, the gradient 
·of the market line is - (l +i). 
Furthermore it is supposed that this individual has a time preference 
function U (Co, C,) whose argument C. is the consumption expenditure of 
the period r (r=O, 1). The curves U, and U, are two of the indifference 
·curves drawn from this time preference function. For instance, every 
point on U2 is indifferent to expenditures R (a combination of consump-
tion expenditures such as OF for the current period and OC for the next 
period) as far as utility for this individual is concerned. 
Now, it is assumed that the purpose for this individual is to maximize 
the utility U (Co, C,) subject to the conditions given above. 
We can see from the diagram that the steps needed for climbing to 
the highest indifference curve attainable starting from point Q are two. 
First, the move to point R' utilizing the productive opportunity of invest-
ment. Second, the move to point R utilizing the market upportunity of 
investment. R is the optimal solution and there the individual has increased 
his utility as much as the difference of U, and U2, as compared with the 
point S where he would be compelled to stop if the market opportunity 
17) In fact, a start can be made from any point on the plane of the diagram. as long as the 
masket line through that point intersects the first quadrant. See [11], p. 206. 
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were not available. 
If we note here that the gradient of the market line is - (l +i), the 
equation of the market line being given in the form of 1 Yl . + Yo= con-
+1 
stant, we can see that the market line has the meaning of an iso-present-
value line, when the interest ratio i is taken to be the discount rate. 
Correspondingly, the first step mentioned above is no more than an opera-
tion to maximize the present value of income under the productive 
opportunity of investment taking the interest rate as the discount rate. 
The productive opportunity of investment QR'T is drawn as a smooth 
curve on the assumption that such projects as treated in Section I are 
available in infinite numbers, each of them being extremely small. If we 
consider a marginal (productive) investment dYo «0) at point R', smce. 
curve QRIT is a tangent to the market line ppl at R', we have: 
dY, (1') dYo = - +z, 
and by rearranging, we get: 
l!i-+dYo=O. 
This means that the net present value of the marginal (productive) 
investment at point R' is zero. Besides, at points on the right hand side 
of R' on the curve QRIT we have: 
dY, (1') dY;<- +z, 
so that considering the sign of dYo, we have: 
f~'i +dYo>O. 
This means that the net present value of the marginal investment at 
those points is positive. Lastly, the assumption that QjRT is concave to· 
the origin means that investment is assumed to be of decreasing returns. 
The foregoing discussion might be sufficient to clarify the correspond-
ence between the practical rule of the net present value method treated 
in Section I and the Fisher-Hirshleiferian type of marginal analysis. 
In passing, note that since the indifference curve U2 is tangent to the 
market line at the optimal point R attained through market transaction,. 
on U2 we have: 
and hence: 
dC, (1') dC, = - +1, 
- ~g: -l=i. 
The left side of this equation is none other than what IS called the mar-
ginal rate of the time preference of this individual. 
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The primary aim of Hirsh-
leifer's analysis in [11] lies in 
illuminating the meaning and 
limits of the two practical rules 
of investment decision--the net 
present value method and the 
internal rate of return method 
--by extending Fisher's method 
of analysis into cases of imperfect 
capital market and multi-periods. 
OL----A7--~Q".-------y"C, But here we have no need to 
Figure 2 trace his arguments thoroughly. 
Let us return to the problem 
of public investment. Disregarding for the moment that a capitalistic 
economy is in reality a mixture of the public and private sectors, let us 
suppose that the omniscient planning authorities design an optimal invest-
ment on behalf of society as a whole. What changes should take place 
in the analysis in comparison with the case of private individual invest-
ment discussed above? 
If we assume a closed economy there is no room for the planning 
authorities as well as for a Robinson Crusoe to find any market opportu-
nity of investment as a datum. The problem to be solved by the plan-
ning authorities is to determine the allocation of consumption and invest-
ment so that the utility function of the planning authorities U (C" C,) 
can be maximized subject to the productive opportunity QST for the 
society as a whole, starting from the initial fund OQ of the society. The 
answer will be given by point S of Figure 2, that is, by the point of QST 
tangent to the indifference curve. 
In this case, in contrast to the previous case of an individual, the 
discount rate can not be given ex ante by the market rate of interest as 
a datum. Rather, when the optimal point S is determined as a point of 
QST tangent to U" the gradient of the tangential line L gives the dis-
count rate as ex post information. In other words, supposing the gradient 
of the line L is - (1 + r), at the point S we have: 
- dY, -1 = _ dC, -1 = r dYo dC, . 
Hence the discount rate r in this case is given by the marginal rate of 
time preference of the planning authorities at the optimal point. 
Now, we have grasped here such a situation as described above as 
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a characteristic feature of the investment decision of the planning authori-
ties, while on the other hand Hirshleifer has noted that such a situation 
·occurs for an individual in the market mechanism whenever he is obliged 
to solve a "capital rationing" problem that forces him to make an invest-
ment decision without depending on borrowing and within a fixed budget18). 
And he is of negative opinion with respect to the usefulness of that 
discount rate which is to be determined in the manner described above, 
asserting that" ...... the present-value or the internal-rate-of-return rules 
·can be formally modified to apply ...... under capital rationing. The 
discount rate to be used ...... is the rate given by the slope of the ...... 
tangency; with this rate, the rules give the correct answer. But this 
rate cannot be discovered until the solution is attained, and so is of no 
assistance in reaching the solution "19\ However, as far as we are starting 
our argument about public investment criteria in the direction of an 
active search for an optimal amount of investment as a whole by utilizing 
the idea of the time preference along the lines suggested by Arrow and 
Marglin, we can not help facing the above-mentioned situation. Or 
rather, I propose that by formulating those settings as in Figure 2 
explicitly as a mathematical programming problem the discount rate 
·can be grasped expressly as a shadow price, whereby the function to 
be played by this rate can also be clarified. 
m Non-Linear Progranuning 
Such a type of approach as to formulate" the capital rationing prob-
lem" as a programming problem after taking the time preference of 
consumption into account, like Fisher-Hirshleifer, and then to obtain the 
discount rate from information provided by the optimal solution has been 
made by Baumol and Quandt using linear programming20). However, 
it seems to me better to adopt the formulation of non-linear program-
ming in order to clarify the similarity and difference between the marginal 
analysis treated in Section II and the mathematical programming. At the 
same time I introduce a plural number (n) of investment projects into 
the analysis. By doing so it becomes possible not only to relate our 
discussion to the previous argument in Section I but also to find a way 
·of relaxing in principle the assumption of omniscience on the part of the 
planning authorities which was imposed on the analysis in Section II. 
18) Hirshleifer, [11], p. 213-217. 
19) Ibid., p. 216. 
20) Baumol and Quandt, [7], pp. 317-329. The problem of public investment is not specifi. 
cally kept in their mind. Therefore they are rather introducing a preference function of 
a private investor. 
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III. 1. Conditions for an Optimal Solution 
We suppose that the problem of the planning authorities is: 




(III . 1) 
I, (Y i T, Y'T-l, ... , Yil , I,,) ;::;;0 (i = 1, ... , n), 
n 
C.;::;;2JY,. (T=I, ... , T), 
i=l 
n _ 
Co + 2J1,,;::;; Yo, 
i=l 
C. GO (T=O,1. ... , T), 
Yi.GO (i=l, ... , n; T=I, ... , T), 
and I"GO (i= 1, ... , n). 
(III • 2) 
(III· 3) 
(III . 4) 
(III . 5) 
(III . 6) 
(III . 7) 
Here the notations are as follows: 
U --time preference function of the planning authorities. 
C. --consumption outlay for the period T. 
I" --investment outlay for the project i. 
Y,. --income produced by the project i for the period T. 
Yo --income for the period 0 given as an initial condition. 
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Ii --transformation function representing the technical input-output 
relation for the project i. 
Here it is assumed that the investment outlay is made only for the 
period 0 and it must be understood that outlay and income are all meas-
ured by a certain unit. 
When compared with the case of the marginal analysis given in rela-
tion with Figure 2 of Section II, not only have we here extended the 
analysis from a two-period analysis to a multi-period analysis and explicitly 
introduced n individual projects which are the components of the invest-
ment possibility as a whole, but also (i) inequality constraints are intro-
duced, (ii) the non-negative condition of variables is introduced and (iii) 
the limitations of resources are explicitly introduced. They, (i), (ii) and 
(iii), are characteristics of non-linear programming, in contrast to classical 
marginal anal ysis21) • 
Now, assuming that function I, is convex (investment projects are 
technologically decreasing returns) and U concave (the planner's prefer-
ence is of decreasing marginal utility), the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the optimal solution of the problem above is, according to the 
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, that there exist non-negative variables la, A" ... , 
AT; Ji" ... , Jin such that :") 
21) For a comparison of classical marginal analysis and non· linear programming. see Chapter 
8 of Dorfman. Samuelson and Solow, [9]. especially Section 6 (pp. 201-203). 
22) Kuhn and Tucker, [12]. p. 486. 
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aU {;;=;} aG, -A, = 0, 
... , 
G'{;;=;}~F,n 
Go + i:.1iO {;;=;} Yo, 
i=l -
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if G, {;} ° ('1'=0,1, 00', T) 
(III . 8) 
ify"L}o (i=l,oO.,n;'1'=l,oO.,T) 
(III . 9) 
if 1iO {>} ° (i=l, 00.' n) 
y", I,,) {;;=;} 0, 
if A,{>}o 
if Ao{>}o 
(III . 10) 
if fL.{>}O (i=1, 00', n) 
(III. 11) 
('1'=1'00" T) 
(III . 12) 
(III . 13) 
These A, ('1'=0, 1, 00', T), fL, (i=l, 00', n) are Lagrange multipliers 
and they can be interpreted as shadow prices"). From (III· 12) and 
(III· 13) it can be seen that A, is the shadow price for the income of 
the period '1', and (III· 8) shows that this does not become smaller than 
the marginal utility of consumption for the period '1' and that as long as 
the consumption outlay for the period '1' is positive, the equality holds. 
Also, if we eliminate fL, from (III· 9) and (III. 10), it can be shown 
that the marginal value product of project i will not exceed the "price" 
.10 of income for the period ° which is the initial fund of investment, and 
that the equality holds as long as the investment outlay is actually car-
ried on. Moreover, it is shown that the marginal investment cost of 
output of project i will not be lower than the price of output or income 
for the period '1' and that the equality holds as long as the output is 
actually produced. 
Furthermore, if (III· 8), (III· 9) and (III· 10) are taken into con-
sideration together, it can be seen that the price .10 is equal both to the 
marginal value product of the project actually carried on and to the 
marginal utility of the consumption for the period ° if the latter is positive. 
On the other hand from (III. 11) it is further shown that project i 
is operating on the frontier of its technical possibility if fL, is positive, 
and operating possibly inwards if fL, is zero. Therefore we may safely say 
that fL, indicates a social evaluation of the technique of the project i"). 
23) As an interesting paper which gives a good example of economic interpretations of Lagrange 
multipliers of non-linear programming, as shadow prices, see Davis and Whinston, [8], pp. 
1-14. 
24) Davis and Whinston have given such p.'s an interpretation as "the implicit :costs of the 
technology constraints ". See [8], p. 4. 
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Now, once we know that Ao, A" ... , AT are evaluations assigned 
respectively to the incomes for the periods 0, 1, ... , T from the viewpoint 
of programming of the planning authorities, we can obtain the discount 
rate to be applied to the income for the period '1" by using the following 
formula which was referred to in Section I: 
(I . 3) 
This is, so to speak, a shadow rate of discount which corresponds to the 
non-linear program mentioned above. 
Here, let us assume that each one of n projects expressed by the 
transformation functions (III. 1) is entrusted to a project manager and 
that the operation of the project is determined by its manager in a 
decentralized manner under the guide of shadow prices Ao, A" ... , A< 
or the shadow rates of discount r" ... , r<. 
Now, suppose that the values of Ao, A" ••. , A< are given. If the mana-
ger of project i is to maximize the net revenue measured by these shadow 
prices, the problem for him IS: 
T 




!,(Y,n Y'T-l, ... , Y", Ito) :£0, 
Y,<;?;O, ('1"=1, ... , T), 
1,o;?;O. 
(III· 15) 
(III . 16) 
(III . 17) 
Since we previously assumed that j, is convex, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the optimal solution is, again according to the 
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, as follows:-
A< - 11, 00;:, {:£)O, if Y" {»O (III -18) 
-' - }j. {:£)O . {=)O I 19 
"0 11, oliO = ' If Ito > ( II· ) 
!'(Y'T' YiT -" ... , Y", Ito) {:£)O, if l1i{> )0. (III. 20) 
These conditions are identical with those for the optimal solution of 
the above-mentioned planning authorities' problem (III . 9), (III. 10) and 
(III· 11). Consequently, the maximizing behaviour of individual project 
managers under the guide of shadow prices is compatible with the opti-
mal solution from the over-all viewpoint under the present assumption. 
However, from (I· 3) : 




(1 +rj ) ..• (l +r,) T 
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so that to maximize the net revenue (III· 14) is equivalent to maximize: 
_J:L+ ... + Y T I l+r, (l+r
'
)"'(l+rT ) - 0, 
which is none other than maximizing the net present value of investment. 
Therefore the proposition above can be restated as follows: the maxi-
mization of the net present value of individual projects under the guide 
of the shadow rates of discount is compatible with the optimal solution 
from the over-all viewpoint. 
III. 3. Decentralized Computation 
So far it has been assumed that shadow pnces or shadow rates of 
discount are given so that the planning authorities are to solve a huge 
non-linear programming problem collecting all technical information con-
cerning the projects. When projects are large in number, this assumption 
becomes unreal in all probability, but the results given in III. 2. suggest 
that there is a way of arriving at the optimal solution without concentrat-
ing all information relating to the projects by an iterative procedure 
between the planning authorities, who announce at each step their tenta-
tive prices or discount rates, and the project managers, who behave as 
profit maximizers taking these prices as guides for their decisions"). 
Specifically, the Arrow-Hurwicz method of decentralization based on 
the gradient method") and the non-linear programming version of the 
Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition principle'" are two representative achieve-
ments which we have as guides for further research. By making use of 
these two guides we can, at least in principle, relax the technical difficul-
ties encountered when we actually try to obtain the rates of discount 
from nation-wide planning computation. 
IV Distance froUl Reality 
We started by noting that it is questionable to apply the investment 
efficiency now being achieved by private investment as a criterion for 
public investment. Then, assuming that there exists a unique value judge-
ment of the society or of the planning authorities with respect to the 
intertemporal allocation of the consumption outlay, we have tried to derive 
the optimal discount rate as a shadow price of a problem to determine 
25) Marglin in [15], Chapters 4-6, from such a viewpoint has discussed some procedures, i. e., 
the three algorithms of Lange-Lerner, Arrow-IIw-wicz and Zoutendijk-Dorfman. BUL Marglin':S 
argument in this book is, concerned with the maximization of the net present value on the 
assumption that the discount rate is given. 
26) Arrow and H urwicz, [2]. 
27) For the decomposition principle for linear programming see Dantzig, G., Linear Programming 
and Extensions, 1953, Chapter 23. For the non-linear programming version, see Malinvaud, 
[14] and Whinston, [21]. 
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the optimal amount of investment for the society. It must be of course 
admitted that there exists a considerable distance between here and 
arriving at a public investment decision in reality. 
IV. 1. Time Preference Function 
The foregoing discussions have assumed that a time prcference func-
tion of the planning authorities exists. However, in reality, we are obliged 
to answer an ethical as well as a logical question, such as the possibility 
of obtaining a rule compatible with democratic procedures. And we must 
also say that there is little point in discussing it if it can not be found 
III an operational form. 
Marglin [16] attempted to answer the former question. 
Private investments of individuals are conducted through the securi-
ties market and the interest rate prevailing there reflects their time pre-
ferences. On the other hand, the government contemplates the welfare 
of future generations based on the sacrifices of the present generation in 
a case like an investment for a dam which lasts for a hundred years, but 
the profitability of this investment is something quite different from the 
case of private investment. On what grounds can the government demand 
such sacrifices of its people? 
According to Marglin there are three answers. One of them is the 
"authoritarian" standpoint which is the view that an individual's time 
preferences are, if seen from society's viewpoint, myopic and irrational, 
the contention of which is represented by Pigou. The second answer is 
the view maintaining that everyone is driven into something like "schi-
zopherenia" because of the discrepancy between his preferences in his 
capacity as an economic man and his preferences in his capacity as a 
citizen, the contention of which is represented by Colm. And Marglin 
himself, taking over the arguments of Baumol and Sen, takes another 
standpoint which comprises the third answer in trying to find an explana-
tion in the" external effects ", which means that each individual's utility 
depends upon the decision of investment to be made by all other indi-
viduals. 
We may say that it is rationalized by such an explanation that there 
should be a difference between the time preference of each individual 
for his private investment and his time preference for public investment. 
Then, is it possible to establish the social time preference function on 
the basis of the time preferences of individuals for public investment? 
In this connection, however, it has been in fact made clear by Arrow's 
study on a more general problem that it is impossible to maks such an 
aggregation in a "democratic" way by satisfying the various kinds of 
desirable axioms. Thus, Marglin after all gives up trying to establish 
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the social time preference function on the basis of the preferences of 
individuals. 
Then, what about the problem of obtaining an operational form of 
the time preference function of the planning authorities? According to 
Marglin it is not necessary to determine the preference function comple-
tely, but it is sufficient to know the marginal rate of time preference in the 
neighbourhood of the optimal investment rate. For this purpose it is 
required at first to choose a certain optimal growth rate "g". By using 
data such as the labour force (and unemployment rate if suitable) it is 
possible to guess from the optimal growth rate the optimal investment 
rate "I" and at the same time the optimal discount rate "r". And, in 
reality the optimal values for g, I and r can be obtained by an iterative 
procedure. 
Consequently, as far as the problem of determining the discount rate 
is concerned, the direction taken by Marglin seems fundamentally similar 
to the direction discussed in this paper, and it seems that this direction 
should be linked with the macro-economic optimal growth theory to make 
further advances and to be more operational. 
IV. 2. Opportunity Cost 
So far my discussion has been carried on as if it were possible in 
reality for the planning authorities to determine the optimal amount of 
investment. It may be true to see things in that manner under the 
conditions in socialist countries, but in capitalist countries there arises 
another serious problem of finding and realizing a due proportion between 
public and private investment. Marglin tries to cope with this difficulty 
mainly by reckoning the opportunity cost as a component of the public 
investment criteria28J, but the analysis of this problem will be taken up 
at another opportunity"). 
IV. 3. Dynamics 
Investment criteria constitute a problem primarily concerned with 
the allocation of intertemporal resources, but the framework of the argu-
ment given in this paper is not of a dynamic nature. The transformation 
functions ii in the non-linear programming model given in III are fixed 
up to the future period T. The outputs produced after period 0 are 
assumed to be exclusively turned into consumption, and no new invest-
28) Marglin, [17] ; and ditto, [18], pp. 54-67. 
29) It is added that, since the problem relating to the composition of benefit and its measure-
ment has been neglected in thi::i paper, the plaIlller's preference function has been considered to 
be concerned only with the conswnption for each period. In reality, particularly in the case 
of developing countries, there may be some occasions which necessitate the pursuit of several 
objectives at the same time, such as corrections of the regional inequalities in addition to the 
mere increase in consumption. Marglin, in [18], with the Indian economy in mind, went 
into some discussion on this point. 
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ment opportunity is taken into consideration. However, the majority of 
discussions about investment criteria that have so far developed, the 
marginal analysis by Hirsh1eifer and the linear programming analysis by 
Baumol-Quandt are of a static nature. A further problem that we must 
face is a study from the dynamic point of view. 
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